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The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor 
Bethmann Hollweg’s Calculated Risk, July 1914 
[1969] 
Konrad H. Jarausch  
Abstract: »Die Illusion eines begrenzten Krieges: Bethmann Hollwegs Politik 
eines kalkulierten Risikos in der Julikrise 1914«. The central figure in the 
Fischer controversy about Germany’s responsibility for the outbreak of the 
First World War was the imperial chancellor Theobald von Bethmann  
Hollweg. On the basis of the controversial diary of his personal assistant Kurt 
Riezler, this article revisits the policy of the civilian leader of the German gov-
ernment, characterized by a “defensive aggressiveness.” Fearing the growth of 
Russian power and closer Anglo-French cooperation, Bethmann was willing to 
run a “calculated risk” by backing a local Balkan war in which Austria could 
defeat Serbia, while risking a continental war with Russia and France in order 
to split the Entente. This gamble failed due to the Russian decision for general 
mobilization, German military pressure to invade Belgium and the British en-
try into the conflict that expanded the conflict to a European war which Berlin 
was unlikely to win. With such arguments the article tries to sketch a complex 
intermediary position between critics and apologists of German “war guilt.” 
Keywords: World War One, Fischer controversy, Bethmann Hollweg, Riezler, 
calculated risk, German war guilt. 
 
The responsibility for the outbreak of World War I weighed heavily upon Im-
perial Germany’s fifth Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg. “This 
war torments me,” he confessed to the Liberal Conrad Haussmann during the 
struggle. “Again and again I ask if it could have been avoided and what I 
should have done differently.” This soul searching led Bethmann to believe that 
“all nations are guilty; Germany, too, bears a large part of the blame.”1 Arguing 
that “our fate is too colossal to have its origins in singular events,” the Chancel-
lor stressed the larger causes of the conflict. Imperialist rivalry, the anti-
German coalition, the growing isolation of Berlin, and Vienna’s relative de-
cline, “all that forced us to adopt a policy of utmost risk, a risk that increased 
with each repetition, in the Moroccan quarrel, in the Bosnian crisis, and then 
                                                             
  Reprint of: Jarausch, Konrad H. 1969. The Illusion of Limited War: Chancellor Bethmann 
Hollweg’s Calculated Risk, July 1914. Central European History 2: 58-76. 
1  Note by Conrad Haussmann, Feb. 24, 1918, about his visit to Hohenfinow; Hauptstaatsar-
chiv Stuttgart (cited HStA Stuttgart), J 47, NH 114. Cf. W. Steglich, Die Friedenspolitik 
der Mittelmächte, 1917-1918 (Wiesbaden, 1968), p. 418. 
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again in the Moroccan question.”2 But he also admitted candidly: “Lord yes, in 
a certain sense it was a preventive war,” motivated by “the constant threat of 
attack, the greater likelihood of its inevitability in the future, and by the mili-
tary’s claim: today war is still possible without defeat, but not in two years! 
Yes, the generals,” he repeated. “It could only have been avoided by a rap-
prochement with England, that is still my conviction. But after we had decided 
for a [common] policy with Austria, we could not desert her in such danger.”3 
Suspecting that “it borders on a preventive war,” Bethmann silenced his con-
science by denying that “we encouraged Austria to attack Serbia, which sounds 
as if we had taken the initiative. That is absolutely false.”4 
For fifty years historians have endeavored to resolve the contradictions inhe-
rent in Bethmann’s self-justification. Returned from the sword to the pen, En-
tente and German scholars attacked one another so violently that the ex-
Chancellor cautioned in 1920: “The war guilt question must be treated objec-
tively by all. Any other method is suspect. The partisan polemics are beginning 
to nauseate the public.”5 But his call for moderation went unheeded and during 
the inter-war period the Kriegsschuldfrage became a symbolic focus of natio-
nalist sentiments.6 The Second World War confirmed the verdict of Versailles, 
but in the early 1950’s the questioning of nationalism produced a Franco-
German declaration, assigning a share of the responsibility to all.7 More recent-
ly Fritz Fischer’s rediscovery of Bethmann’s annexationism reopened the old 
wounds, allowing East German and Western historians to affirm what they had 
long suspected: The war “was deliberately provoked, not stumbled into.”8 Most 
                                                             
2  Bethmann to Bülow, June 10, 1915; Bundesarchiv Coblenz (cited BA Coblenz), Nachlass 
Bülow. Cf. O. Hammann, Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit (Berlin, 1922), pp. 122ff. 
3  Conrad Haussmann, loc. cit. 
4  Bethmann to Jagow, June 11, 1919; Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, Bonn (cited 
AA Bonn), Nachlass Jagow. 
5  Bethmann to Rassow, Aug. 18, 1920; Privatnachlass Rassow, courtesy of Mrs. P. Rassow, 
Cologne. 
6  A. von Wegerer, Bibliographie zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges (Berlin, 1934), and M. 
Gunzenhäuser, “Die Bibliographien zur Geschichte des ersten Weltkrieges,” Schriften der 
Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte (Frankfurt, 1964). See also P. Renouvin, Les Origines im-
médiates de la guerre (Paris, 1925); S. B. Fay, The Origins of the World War (2 vols., New 
York, 1928); B. E. Schmitt, The Coming of the War (New York, 1930); A. von Wegerer, 
Der Ausbruch des Weltkrieges (Hamburg, 1939); and L. Albertini, Le origini delta guerra 
del 1914 (3 vols., Milan, 1942-43). 
7  James A. Corbett, “France and Germany Agree – on the Past,” Historical Bulletin, XXVII 
(March, 1955), 158-62. 
8  Fritz Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht (Düsseldorf, 1961; 3rd ed. 1963), now translated as 
Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York, 1967); “Deutsche Kriegsziele,” Histo-
rische Zeitschrift, CLXXXVIII (1959), 249-310; “Kontinuität des Irrtums,” ibid., CXCI 
(1960), 83-100; “Weltpolitik, Weltmachstreben und deutsche Kriegsziele,” ibid., CXCIX 
(1964), 265-346; Weltmacht oder Niedergang? (Hamburg, 1965). Cf. K. Epstein, “German 
War Aims in the First World War,” World Politics, XV (1962), 163-85. The most judicious 
summary of the controversy is W. J. Mommsen, “The Debate on German War Aims,” in 
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West German scholars, led by Egmont Zechlin, rallied behind their dean, the 
late Gerhard Ritter, claiming in spiritual defense of their fatherland that it was 
not a preventive but a defensive war.9 Now historians must once more face the 
perennial question: Did Germany unleash the war deliberately to become a 
world power or did she support Austria merely to defend her weakening ally? 
Curiously enough, one of the obvious avenues of investigation has hitherto 
been neglected: the study of Germany’s constitutionally responsible statesman, 
Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. A fascinating new document, the diary of his 
personal adlatus in the Wilhelmstrasse, Kurt Riezler, offers fresh perspectives 
on the motives of Bethmann’s policies in the July crisis.10 Scion of a family of 
prominent South German scholars, Riezler worked as a free-lance writer after 
completing his doctorate and entered the imperial foreign service in 1909. 
Three years later this gifted and spirited young man was detailed to serve as 
Bethmann’s special assistant, drafting directives and helping to shape and 
clarify policy. To systematize his experience Riezler wrote two books on world 
politics before 1914, arguing for the necessity of a unified theory of interna-
tional relations and sketching the general outlines of German Weltpolitik. 
Source of ideas, partner for thought-provoking discussions, and confidant of 
the Chancellor, he lacked any firm place in the governmental hierarchy. Hence 
his diary is an artistic record of moods, feelings, and conversations, rather than 
                                                                                                                                
the enlarged paperback edition of Journal of Contemporary History, I, No. 3 (1966), 45-70. 
See also E. W. Lynar, Deutsche Kriegsziele 1914-1918 (Berlin, 1964), and K. Barthel, “Be-
obachtungen am Rande der Kriegszieldiskussion,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unter-
richt, XVI (1965), 83-88. For the East German view see F. Klein, “Die westdeutsche Ge-
schichtsschreibung und die Ziele des deutschen Imperialismus im Ersten Weltkrieg,” 
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, X (1962), 1808-36, and W. Gutsche, “Erst Europa – 
und dann die Welt,” ibid., XII (1964), 745-67. 
9  Gerhard Ritter, Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk, II, III (Munich, 1960, 1964); Der 
Schlieffenplan (Munich, 1956); “Der Anteil der Militärs an der Kriegskatastrophe von 
1914,” Historische Zeitschrift, CXCIII (1961), 72-91; “Eine neue Kriegsschuldthese?” 
ibid., CXCIV (1962), 646-08; “Bethmann Hollweg im Schlaglicht des deutschen Ge-
schichtsrevisionismus,” Schweizer Monatshefte, XLII (1962-63), 700-708. Unfortunately 
Zechlin’s contributions are scattered: “Deutschland zwischen Kabinettskrieg und Wirt-
schaftskrieg,” Historische Zeitschrift, CXCIX (1964), 347-458; “Friedensbestrebungen und 
Revolutionierungsversuche,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, supplement to Das Parlament 
(1961), Nos. 20, 24, 25; (1963), Nos. 20 and 23; “Probleme des Kriegskalküls und der 
Kriegsbeendigung im ersten Weltkrieg,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, XIV 
(1963), 533-55. 
10  The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Kurt Riezler’s daughter, Mrs. M. White, 
for making the diary available to him. Cf. K. D. Erdmann, “Zur Beurteilung Bethmann 
Hollwegs,” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht, XV (1964), 525-40, and Die Zeit, 
Jan. 16, 1968. See also F. Stern, “Bethmann Hollweg and the War: The Limits of Respon-
sibility,” in L. Krieger and Fritz Stern, eds., The Responsibility of Power (Garden City, 
N.Y., 1967), pp. 252-85, and Die Zeit, Jan. 2, 1968. 
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a systematic exposition of fact; but precisely its intuitive quality helps resolve 
the enigma of Bethmann’s aims in the July crisis.11 
Grandson of Bismarck’s liberal opponent Moritz August von Bethmann 
Hollweg and younger son of the gentleman farmer Felix, Theobald was born in 
1856 on the family estate of Hohenfinow, barely two hours from Berlin.12 
Raised more freely than a typical Junker, he was tutored at home and sent to 
the elite school Schulpforta where he graduated as primus omnium in 1875. 
After the customary year with the dragoons, he studied law at Strasbourg, 
Leipzig, and Berlin and entered the Prussian civil service in 1884 as Landrat in 
                                                             
11  Theodor Heuss, “A Word in Memory of Kurt Riezler,” and L. Strauss, “Kurt Riezler, 1882-
1955,” Social Research, XXIII (1956), 1-34. Recently Riezler‘s writings have been 
rediscovered: Die Erforderlichkeit des Unmöglichen: Prolegomena zu einer Theorie der 
Politik und zu anderen Theorien (Munich, 1913) and, under the pseudonym J. J. 
Ruedorffer, Grundzüge der Weltpolitik in der Gegenwart (Stuttgart, 1914). Cf. A. Hillgru-
ber, “Riezlers Theorie des kalkulierten Risikos und Bethmann Hollwegs politische Konzep-
tion in der Julikrise 1914,” Historische Zeitschrift, CCII (1966), 333-51, and H. Pogge-von 
Strandmann and I. Geiss, Die Erforderlichkeit des Unmöglichen (Hamburg, 1965). To 
prove the inaccuracy of the latter’s charge that the Grundzüge are pan-German, one only 
has to point to their condemnation by “Sg” [Franz Sonntag] in Alldeutsche Blätter, XXIV, 
Dec. 19, 1914, and XXV, Jan. 16, 1915. According to Bethmann’s son Felix, the relation-
ship was that of a bright young man and a skeptical elder statesman whose difference in 
age, temperament, and responsibility made for scintillating discussions while riding in the 
Tiergarten. But Riezler’s liberal imperialist writings cannot simply be taken to express the 
Chancellor’s more cautious foreign policy. After resigning from the diplomatic service, 
Riezler was a professor of philosophy at Munich, Rektor at the University of Frankfurt, and 
emigrated to the U.S. in 1939 where he taught at the New School for Social Research until 
1952. 
12  There is no biography of Bethmann. The editor of Die Grosse Politik, F. Thimme, gathered 
material for such a work and wrote numerous articles on the Chancellor until his premature 
death in 1938. “F. Thimme zum Gedächtnis,” W. Frauendienst, Berliner Monatshefte, XVI 
(1938), 821-26, and the Thimme Nachlass, BA Coblenz. The material in Bethmann’s per-
sonnel files in the Deutsches Zentralarchiv, Merseburg (cited DZA Merseburg) and, after 
1905, the BA Coblenz is disappointing. The Chancellor’s Nachlass was destroyed in 1945 
in Hohenfinow. Except for the adulatory H. Kötschke, Unser Reichskanzler (Berlin, 1916), 
and G. Egelhaaf, Der fünfte Reichskanzler (Stuttgart, 1916), contemporary accounts are 
virulent diatribes against him: “Junius Alter” [pseud, for Franz Sonntag], Das deutsche 
Reich auf dem Wege zur geschichtlichen Episode (Munich, 1919); W. Kapp, Die nationalen 
Kreise und der Reichskanzler (Königsberg, 1916); and H. von Liebig, Die Politik Bethmann 
Hollwegs (Munich, 1919). The unpublished dissertations by B. Haberland, “Die Innenpoli-
tik des Reiches unter der Kanzlerschaft Bethmann Hollwegs 1909-1911” (Kiel, 1951); R. 
Koschnitzke, “Die Innenpolitik des Reichskanzlers von Bethmann Hollweg im Weltkriege” 
(Kiel, 1952), and Johanna Schellenberg’s just completed thesis (East Berlin) lack full 
documentation. More serious contributions are H. G. Zmarzlik, Bethmann Hollweg als 
Reichskanzler, 1909-1914 (Düsseldorf, 1957), and K. H. Janssen, Der Kanzler und der Ge-
neral, 1914-1916 (Göttingen, 1967). To date the best monographs are the Habilitations-
schriften by W. Gutsche, “Die Beziehungen zwischen der Regierung Bethmann Hollweg 
und dem Monopolkapital in den ersten Monaten des Weltkriegs” (East Berlin, 1967), and 
W. J. Mommsen, “Bethmann Hollweg und das Problem der politischen Führung, 1909-
1914” (Cologne, 1967). 
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Freienwalde upon completion of a doctorate of jurisprudence. Repeated hunt-
ing visits of William II brought him to the attention of the provincial adminis-
tration which called him to Potsdam in 1896, where he rose rapidly. In summer 
1899 Bethmann became Regierungspräsident of West Prussia and in the fall of 
the same year, Oberpräsident of the Mark Brandenburg. Having declined it two 
years earlier, he accepted the Prussian Ministry of the Interior in 1905, and 
after Posadowsky’s fall, Bülow made him Vice-Chancellor and Imperial Secre-
tary of Interior in the summer of 1907. Because of Bülow’s estrangement from 
William II over the Daily Telegraph affair, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg 
was appointed Chancellor on July 14, 1909, to continue his predecessor’s poli-
cies without his personal liabilities.13 
The popular stereotype of “the philosopher from Hohenfinow” described 
merely Bethmann’s outward appearance. Despite his anachronistic “humanita-
rianism, his seriousness, and his incapacity for ostentation,” Riezler recognized 
that “he is not at all unequivocal. His cunning is as great as his bungling. Both 
alternate.” It was “totally wrong” to consider him only a clever and cultured 
bureaucrat. “In breadth and independence of vision he is a great man.” In sharp 
contrast to his contemporaries “his judgment forms quite independently. He 
says only things unsaid and unheard.” Bethmann’s assistant was continually 
puzzled by “this curious man. He is not at all winning, except with excellent 
wine, music, and deep conversation. But he has much that is ethically engag-
ing. However, that has no appeal for our politicians. Unbearable in many de-
tails, he is admirable in great things.” Riezler was often exasperated by “his 
personal difficulties, his handicaps in dealing with people.” Despite his rhetori-
cal gifts, Bethmann lacked charisma, and preferred cabinet diplomacy to mass 
appeals. Contrary to general opinion he possessed an instinct for power strong 
enough to outlast such rivals as Falkenhayn, Tirpitz, and Bülow. Though 
blessed with “a great mind,” he was “unable to cope with the routine of poli-
tics.” Statesmanlike in fundamentals, “the Chancellor has absolutely no talent 
for dealing with the military, for impressing them and getting information from 
them.”14 
                                                             
13  Bethmann’s own writings failed to make his historical image more distinct, since he dis-
dained to engage in the ugly postwar polemics of his erstwhile adversaries: Betrachtungen 
zum Weltkriege (2 vols., Berlin, 1919-21); Kriegsreden, ed. F. Thimme (Berlin, 1919); 
“Das Friedensangebot von 1915,” Preussische Jahrbücher, CLXXVIII (1919), 114-16; 
“Friedensmöglichkeiten im Frühsommer 1917,” Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Feb. 29, 
1920; Friedensangebot und U-Boot-Krieg (Berlin, 1919). 
14  Riezler diary, July 13, 20, 27, Aug. 21, Oct. 10, 1914. According to Hammann, Bethmann’s 
“most difficult struggle was against himself.” Bilder, pp. 66ff. In the Deutsches Bio-
graphisches Jahrbuch für 1921, pp. 21-41, F. Hartung called him “a Hamlet personality,” 
and in the Neue Deutsche Biographie, pp. 188-93, W. Frauendienst maintained: “He was 
basically not a homo politicus.” Cf. G. P. Gooch, “Bethmann Hollweg,” Dictionnaire 
Diplomatique (Paris, 1954), pp. 103ff. 
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In foreign policy Bethmann Hollweg’s lodestar was “Weltpolitik but no 
war!”15 A sincere patriot, occasionally even a nationalist, he nevertheless 
loathed the pan-Germans: “With these idiots nobody can conduct a sane poli-
cy,” he angrily complained to his cousin Pourtalès, German Ambassador in St. 
Petersburg.16 Above all, Bethmann strove for a rapprochement with Great Brit-
ain. “Like you,” he confided to Eisendecher, a close friend, “I believe our most 
urgent task is a modus vivendi with England. In the last analysis even Morocco 
was intended to facilitate this.” Provoked by Lloyd George’s belligerent Man-
sion House speech, he warned:  
We should do everything our finances allow for our defenses on land and sea, 
but we must work as quietly as possible, not threaten boisterously. Only then 
can we improve our relations with London and prevent a new naval law from 
leading to war.”17 
As eastern counterpart, Bethmann prided himself on “having reestablished and 
reconfirmed intimate and friendly relations with St. Petersburg in the entrevues 
of Berlin and Baltischport.”18 Far from dreams of an Endabrechnung with the 
Slavic and Romance peoples, as was demanded by the military writer Bern-
hardi, the Chancellor worked for a Bismarckian peace. “We must keep France 
in check through a cautious policy towards Russia and England. Naturally this 
does not please our chauvinists and is unpopular. But I see no alternative for 
Germany in the near future.”19 Though sometimes committing minor faux pas 
in protocol, Bethmann understood the basic structure of European diplomacy 
more clearly than his nationalist critics. During the Balkan wars, he pushed for 
moderation in Vienna, but in the spring of 1914 he paused: “Future develop-
ments cause me some concern. Rumania is quite irritated at Austria and Russia 
braces itself strongly in case of a renewed flare-up in the Balkans.” Percep-
tively he predicted: “If the Ballplatz again pursues a policy of prestige without 
backing it up, the situation can become very serious.” The Chancellor had no 
illusions about the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berchtold: “Vienna continues to 
flirt with Sofia – of course without success if the chips are down, cannot get 
along with Serbia, and does not understand that it will eventually have to gain 
access to the Adriatic in any case.” As a result “in a real conflict Austria will 
                                                             
15  Anon. [Hans Plehn], Weltpolitik und kein Krieg! (Berlin, 1913), inspired by the liberal 
imperialist diplomat Kühlmann. For Bethmann‘s pre-war foreign policy cf. the unpublished 
dissertations of F. Strigel, “Die deutsch-englischen Flottenverhandlungen in den Jahren 
1909-1911 unter Bethmann Hollweg” (Würzburg, 1935); A. Kessler, “Das deutsch-
englische Verhältnis vom Amtsantritt Bethmann Hollwegs bis zur Haldane Mission” (Er-
langen, 1938); and H. J. Henning, “Deutschlands Verhältnis zu England in Bethmann 
Hollwegs Aussenpolitik 1909-1914” (Cologne, 1962). 
16  Bethmann to Pourtalès, July 30, 1912; AA Bonn, Nachlass Pourtalès. 
17  Bethmann to Eisendecher, Dec. 26, 1911; AA Bonn, Nachlass Eisendecher. 
18  Bethmann to Eisendecher, July 22, 1912; ibid. 
19  Bethmann to Eisendecher, Mar. 23, 1913; ibid. 
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have except for Russia [sic] the entire Balkans, possibly even Turkey against it. 
We must not allow such a fate to overwhelm us. But resisting it is hard.” De-
spite such dire predictions, Bethmann was not resigned to the catastrophe, 
hoping for a breakthrough in colonial negotiations with Whitehall: “Progress 
continues with England. But London is unyielding in its desire not to alienate 
France which takes offense at the most trivial incident.”20 
This slow but steady Anglo-German rapprochement was abruptly cut short 
by Princip’s shots at Sarajevo. “The dynasty of Habsburg-Lorraine truly is a 
house of Atrides, tottering from catastrophe to catastrophe,” Foreign Secretary 
Jagow wrote to a friend on July 6, 1914.  
The political effects are difficult to foresee, because too little is known about 
the new successor. The old Emperor’s life is ebbing, his will power and re-
solve, never very strong, are exhausted – and the heir is quite young. Mean-
while the Empire dissolves more and more, losing prestige and coherence in-
ternally and externally. A strong hand is needed to gather the reins. Will the 
young prince [Charles] possess it?21 
The initial response of the German government to the assassination was hesi-
tant, groping, and generally peaceful. Old Count Tschirschky, German ambas-
sador to the Hofburg, affirmed Berlin’s support of the alliance, but “used every 
opportunity in order to warn quietly but seriously and emphatically against 
precipitous steps.”22 Remembering Franz Ferdinand’s warm hospitality only 
three weeks earlier, the impetuous Emperor called for a showdown with Serbia 
“now or never,” reprimanding the ambassador for his timidity.23 Count 
Tschirschky must have heard of the royal displeasure since he assured Francis 
Joseph several days later “that Germany would firmly back Austria, if its vital 
                                                             
20  Bethmann to Eisendecher, Apr. 7, 1914; ibid. Cf. also England 78 No. 3 secr., vols, I-XX; 
Deutschland 131 secr., vols, XIV ff. Deutschland 131, vols, XXXI ff., for his Russian and 
British policies. On June 4 Bethmann had a long conversation with Bavarian Ambassador 
Lerchenfeld: “He bluntly called our diplomatic situation bad.” Even if England did not en-
gage in provocative measures, “this would not prevent it from joining our enemies in case 
of war.” Bethmann did not fear France, but “Russia was becoming more dangerous,” since 
pan-Slavism might lead to war. The Chancellor rejected a preventive strike, because it 
“would topple several thrones.” Lerchenfeld gathered the impression that Bethmann viewed 
“the general political situation not at all optimistically.” Lerchenfeld to Hertling, June 4, 
1914; Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich (cited Bayr. HStA Munich). 
21  V. Dedijer, The Road to Sarajevo (London, 1967). Jagow to Gerhard (Meyer), July 6, 1914: 
AA Bonn, Nachlass Jagow. 
22  Tschirschky to Bethmann, June 30, 1914; AA Bonn.Wk vol. 1. I. Geiss, Julikrise und 
Kriegsausbruch (2 vols., Hanover, 1963-64), is a useful compilation of the printed sources. 
For his views on the July crisis see: “The Outbreak of the First World War and German 
War Aims,” Journal of Contemporary History, enlarged paperback edition, 1, No. 3 (1966), 
71-87. 
23  William II’s marginalia on Tschirschky to Bethmann, June 30; AA Bonn, Wk vol. I. Cf. 
also P. S. Thielen, “Die Marginalien Wilhelms II,” Die Welt als Geschichte, XX (1960), 
255ff. 
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interests were imperiled.” The envoy’s emphasis on a concerted plan of action 
foreshadowed a firmer German stand, but the Chancellor was still vacationing 
at Hohenfinow and Foreign Secretary Jagow was on his honeymoon.24 
On July 5, William II recalled Bethmann to Berlin to consider Francis  
Joseph’s appeal for help, transmitted by the hawkish Austrian diplomat Count 
Hoyos. “The Emperor received me and Undersecretary of State Zimmermann 
in the Park of the Neues Palais in Potsdam. No one else was present,” the 
Chancellor later recalled. Having read the strongly worded Austrian memoran-
dum,  
the Emperor declared that he could not deceive himself about the grave danger 
in which the pan-Serbian propaganda had placed Austria. But it was not up to 
us to advise our ally how to react to the bloodbath of Sarajevo. Vienna herself 
had to decide that. 
William recommended a three-fold response: “We should abstain from direct 
influence and advice, since we should work with all our means towards the 
goal of not letting the Austro-Serbian quarrel become an international conflict.” 
But “Emperor Francis Joseph should know that we will not desert Austria-
Hungary in this serious hour. Our own vital interests demand the preservation 
of Austria” as a great power. And following Berchtold’s advice, “he considered 
it desirable to draw Bulgaria [into the alliance] as long as that would not alien-
ate Rumania.” Bethmann accepted this analysis since “these opinions of the 
Emperor coincided with my own.”25 Later the same afternoon the hastily re-
called military advisers of William minimized the gravity of the expected risk. 
Summarizing the informal discussions between Bethmann, Zimmermann, 
Minister of War Falkenhayn, and the chief of the military cabinet Lyncker, 
Adjudant General Plessen jotted into his diary: “The opinion prevails that we 
should move against Serbia the sooner the better, and that the Russians – al-
though friends of Serbia – will not intervene.” But Falkenhayn reassured 
Moltke, Chief of the General Staff: “The Chancellor, who was also in Potsdam, 
seems to believe as little as I that the Austrian government is serious about its 
recently more forceful language.”26 
With such military encouragement, Bethmann gave the Austrian ambassa-
dor, Count Szögyény, one of the most momentous assurances of European 
history the following morning:  
                                                             
24  Tschirschky to Bethmann, July 2; AA Bonn, Wk vol. I. For the ambassador’s surprising 
about-face cf. H. Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold (Vienna, 1963), II, 566ff. 
25  Bethmann Hollweg, Betrachtungen, I, 134ff., and II, 241ff. For his reply to the parliamenta-
ry commission of inquiry see Stenographische Berichte des Untersuchungsausschusses 
(cited UA), I, 3-23, 79ff. 
26  Geiss, Julikrise, I, No. 24a-c, Plessen diary, July 5, and Falkenhayn to Moltke, July 5: 
“Surely in no case will the next few weeks bring a decision.” For the myth of the crown 
council see G. Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army (New York, 1964), p. 292. 
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Concerning Austria’s relations with Serbia the German government believes 
that Vienna has to judge what has to be done to clarify this relationship; in this 
undertaking it can count safely on Germany’s support of the monarchy as ally 
and friend – whatever its decision. 
To bolster the war party in Vienna, Szögyény concluded his despatch energeti-
cally: “In the further course of the conversation, I realized that the Chancellor, 
like his imperial master, considers our immediate intervention against Serbia 
the most radical and the best solution of our Balkan difficulties.”27 
Why did Bethmann Hollweg depart so suddenly and fundamentally from his 
earlier policy of restraint towards Austria during the Balkan wars? The official 
documents contain no clue to his motivation. Conscious of Berchtold’s desire 
for local war, the Chancellor gave more than a blank check. Prodded by Wil-
liam, Hoyos, and Zimmermann and encouraged by the generals, Bethmann 
formulated a coherent rationale, calling for a diplomatic offensive on the Bal-
kans in which the Austrian punishment of Serbia would be just one part. Con-
trary to the tenor of the alliance with Rumania, Bethmann informed his ambas-
sador in Bucharest that “H.M. understands that Emperor Francis Joseph 
considers reconciliation with Serbia impossible and attempts to counteract the 
dangers threatening his House and Empire from Belgrade through an alliance 
with Bulgaria.”28 The Sarajevo assassination gave Germany the historic chance 
for breaking the tightening vise of encirclement through a realignment of the 
south-eastern powers. The adherence of Bulgaria and Turkey to the Triple 
Alliance and the strengthening of dynastic ties with Rumania and Greece 
would isolate Serbia politically and militarily and eliminate Russian influence 
from the area. A quick diplomatic or if need be military triumph of Austria 
would restore the Central Powers’ waning prestige. When the Frankfurter 
Zeitung predicted on July 9 that Vienna’s “diplomatic and political action” 
against Belgrade would “probably be executed in short, swift strokes,” Beth-
mann heartily agreed: “Very good.”29 
Back in Hohenfinow after the momentous decision, the Chancellor ex-
plained the reasons for his reversal to Riezler “at night on the veranda under the 
starry sky.” Bethmann pessimistically regarded the rumored “Anglo-Russian 
negotiations for a naval agreement and a landing in Pomerania as the last link 
                                                             
27  Szögyény to Berchtold, July 6; Geiss, I, No. 27. According to the Austrian ambassador, 
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in a chain.” Although the British Admiralty publicly denied these reports, the 
increasing military cooperation among the Entente distressed the Chancellor. 
Bethmann feared that the German ambassador to the Court of St. James, Prince 
Lichnowsky, was much too credulous and could easily be duped by the wily 
British. Recent general staff studies had reinforced Bethmann’s fear of “Rus-
sia’s quickly growing military might. After the completion of their strategic 
railroads in Poland our position [will be] untenable.” Austria was growing 
“weaker and more immobile” by the day. Vienna was “increasingly under-
mined from north and south-east, at any rate incapable of going to war for 
German interests as our ally.” The Chancellor dismally concluded his military 
assessment: “The Entente knows that we are, therefore, completely para-
lyzed.”30 
The crime of Sarajevo called for “grave decisions.” Apparently “official 
Serbia [is] incriminated. Austria wants to pull itself together,” judging from 
“Francis Joseph’s mission to the Emperor inquiring about the casus foederis.” 
Now the Chancellor was confronted with our “old dilemma at every Austrian 
action in the Balkans. If we encourage them, they say we pushed them into it. If 
we discourage them, they say we left them in the lurch.” Despairingly he pre-
dicted: “Then they will throw themselves into the open arms of the Western 
powers and we lose our last important ally.” Fearing the break-up of the Dual 
Alliance, strained by German moderation in the Balkan wars, Bethmann consi-
dered his predicament “worse than in 1912, because this time Austria is on the 
defensive against Serbo-Russian intrigues” and could not be restrained so easi-
ly. Backing Vienna entailed considerable risks as well: “An attack on Serbia 
can lead to world war.” Any general conflagration “however it ends [will lead] 
to a revolution of all existing conditions.” But inaction was worse: “The future 
belongs to Russia which grows and grows, looming above us as an increasingly 
terrifying nightmare.” Under this heavy responsibility Bethmann decided on a 
leap forward. “Perhaps the old Emperor [Francis Joseph] will prefer not to fight 
after all,” the Chancellor consoled himself. “If war comes from the east so that 
we have to fight for Austria-Hungary and not Austria-Hungary for us, we have 
a chance of winning.” And better yet, “if war does not break out, if the Tsar is 
unwilling or France, alarmed, counsels peace, we have the prospect of splitting 
the Entente.”31 
                                                             
30  Riezler diary, July 7. Two general staff studies, “The Completion of the Russian Railroad 
Network” and “The Growing Power of Russia,” were received by Zimmermann the day 
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Although uncertain about the likelihood of war, Bethmann resolved to run a 
calculated risk. Full support of Berchtold’s desire for the punishment of Serbia 
could have three consequences: A local Balkan war would bring a diplomatic 
triumph, a realignment of the south-eastern states and the break-up of the En-
tente. Equally likely seemed a continental war, engulfing Russia, Austria, 
France, and Germany. In such a conflict, the general staff promised a good 
chance of winning. Less desirable than a localized conflict, a continental strug-
gle might ease the Russian pressure from the east, revitalize faltering Austria 
and regain the diplomatic initiative in the Balkans. In Bethmann’s mind only 
the last alternative was fraught with unacceptable danger: world war. The in-
tervention of Britain or any other great power would upset the carefully ba-
lanced odds. Bethmann did not gamble frivolously, but because he considered 
“our position desperate,” hoping only, “if war comes and the veils fall, the 
whole nation will follow, driven by necessity and peril.” Riezler longed for 
“victory as liberation,” since he was “too young not to succumb to the lure of 
the new, the great movement.” But for Bethmann “this action is a leap in the 
dark and as such the most serious duty.” While the pan-Germans were jubilant, 
the navy, army, and colonial leagues ecstatic, and the students feverish with 
misguided idealism, the aging Chancellor entered on the uncertain course with 
great reluctance.32 
Bethmann’s diplomatic gamble was not only endorsed but actively pro-
moted by the other leaders of the Wilhelmian empire. The Emperor’s early pro-
war commitment prejudiced the issue before his Chancellor could advise diffe-
rently. In the absence of the cautious Jagow, the energetic Zimmermann was 
swayed by Hoyos who considered the moment opportune for a Rachezug 
against Serbia, and when summarizing the Austrian memorandum Zimmerman 
counseled Bethmann to take resolute action.33 Only two months earlier Moltke 
had told Jagow: “We must wage a preventive war to conquer our opponents as 
long as we still have a reasonable chance in the struggle.”34 The emotional 
impact of the murder on the sincere monarchist Bethmann at a time when he 
was still in mourning over the death of his wife was also severe. But there is no 
proof of industrialist pressure for war. On the contrary, English Ambassador 
Goschen stressed in a private letter to Sir Arthur Nicolson in London: “I hear in 
fact from all sides that the financial and industrial classes are dead against a 
war in any shape – but particularly against a war which in its origins does not 
                                                             
32  Riezler diary, July 14. Bethmann was disturbed that “Italy is flirting with Russia,” fearing 
Rome’s desertion of the Triple Alliance, since “it only wants to feed on the corpses!” 
33  Soden to Hertling, July 9; Bayr. HStA Munich, MA III 2691/2. Zimmermann was so trucu-
lent since he “certainly believed that it would be possible to localize the war.” 
34  “Gespräch mit General Moltke im Frühjahr 1914,” pp. 82-86; AA Bonn, Nachlass Jagow, 
MS Politische Aufsätze. “Except for defense we had no war aims such as conquests that 
would have justified the heavy sacrifice of lives.” 
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touch German interests.”35 In the July crisis of 1914 Bethmann believed that he 
acted in keeping with his earlier rejected letter of resignation in protest against 
the naval race: 
If war is forced upon us, we shall fight and, with God’s help, not perish. But 
to conjure up a war ourselves without having our honor or vital interests impe-
riled, this I would consider a sin against Germany’s destiny, even if human fo-
resight would predict a total victory.36 
After the fateful decision of July 5, Bethmann’s chief concern became the 
smooth execution of the diplomatic offensive in the Balkans. To be sure, the 
Chancellor had pledged his unconditional support, but Berchtold, the Hungar-
ian Premier Tisza, and the old Emperor were still in control of their own ac-
tions. “In Vienna there seem to be differences over the method [of punishment] 
between Berchtold and Tisza,” Riezler recorded. “It is hardly possible to guide 
their hand from Berlin. Apparently they want a short ultimatum and in case of 
Serbian rejection, intervention. They seem to need an eternity to mobilize.” The 
Hofburg’s indecision “endangered” Bethmann’s diplomatic calculation, which 
relied upon “a rapid fait accompli and afterwards friendship towards the En-
tente, then the shock will be weathered. [We have] to expose the Serbian in-
trigues with solid and overwhelming evidence that cannot be questioned.”37 
The Chancellor remained in touch with Austrian intentions, but he did not 
intervene again until his return to the Wilhelmstrasse during the climax of the 
crisis. “Berchtold debates the timing, before or after Poincaré’s visit to Peters-
burg. Better before, because then there is a greater chance that France, suddenly 
frightened by the spectre of war, will counsel peace in Russia,” Riezler noted 
wishfully. “Austria has decided on this course today but the Hungarian harvest 
has to be gathered first.”38 The Wilhelmstrasse, and more strongly the two 
ambassadors Tschirschky and Szögyény, urged Berchtold to take speedy ac-
tion, lest Europe intervene in the Austro-Serbian quarrel. Such pressure 
strengthened the war party in Vienna, but the time it took to persuade Tisza of 
the need for war, the Ballplatz’s slow collection of the crime dossier, and Chief 
of Staff Conrad’s halting military preparations undermined Bethmann’s ration-
                                                             
35  G. P. Gooch and H. Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-
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36  Bethmann to William II, Mar. 6, 1912; DZA Merseburg, Rep. 89H, Reichssteuern II, vol. I. 
37  Riezler diary, July 11, 1914. On die 9th Bethmann briefed Vice-Chancellor Delbrück who 
reacted to the planned Austrian ultimatum: “That means war.” Bethmann was still confi-
dent: “To be sure he did not know the details of the supposed ultimatum but should serious 
consequences develop between Austria and Serbia, he believed they could be successfully 
localized.” C. von Delbrück, Die wirtschaftliche Mobilmachung in Deutschland (Munich, 
1924), pp. 96f. 
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ale.39 Despite possible complications, Jagow reaffirmed the German strategy 
after coming back from his honeymoon: “In all circumstances, we want the 
conflict to be localized.” Berlin’s proddings in Vienna and attempts to shield 
Austria diplomatically were directed towards a quick punitive strike, but not 
towards a continental or world war.40 
On the eve of the Austrian ultimatum tension mounted in Berlin. “We have 
unequivocally assured our support. The atmosphere is very serious. A heavy 
cloud of open mourning and of gravest responsibility hangs over men and 
conversations.” Bethmann marvelled at “Russia’s increasing demands and 
incredible dynamism.” The Chancellor feared that “it cannot be fended off any 
longer, especially if the present European constellation continues.” He won-
dered “how the current system of alliances can be toppled and remodeled. But 
is that possible? Only if Russia realizes that it has to reach an understanding 
with us because the Western powers did not back it to the hilt in the Serbian 
quarrel.” Now Bethmann began to ask himself if it had had to come to this. 
“Should he have, in 1912, insisted on his resignation, which had been submit-
ted and refused after the Emperor had decided in favor of Tirpitz in the ques-
tion of the three battle cruisers?” In order to keep the chancellorship from fall-
ing to the ambitious admiral and to prevent the empty prestige policy of the 
Right, Bethmann had stayed on.41 
Although Zimmermann conveyed the tenor of the Austrian demands to the 
Bavarian ambassador on July 18, the Chancellor did not dictate the ultimatum 
to Berchtold.42 Jagow did stress, in an instruction to Tschirschky, that the note 
would have to take European opinion into account, but the Riezler diary con-
firms that it did not originate in Berlin.43 The Wilhelmstrasse was impatient 
with the Austrian Schlamperei, which made the fait accompli more difficult to 
shield, but it did not intervene directly. Bethmann only repeatedly urged the 
Emperor to continue his northern tour in order not to alarm the British Admi-
ralty.44 
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In a private letter to the governor of Alsace-Lorraine, the Chancellor 
stressed that provocative measures on the French border should be prevented. 
His diplomatic calculation appears clearly in his hope: “If we succeed not only 
in keeping France itself quiet, but also in having it plead for peace in  
Petersburg, this turn of events will weaken the Franco-Russian alliance.”45 
On July 20, the Chancellor protested to the Emperor against the belligerent 
telegrams sent by Crown Prince William to pan-German writers. Bethmann 
implored William II to prohibit such public displays  
which our enemies would consider as planned provocation after all that has 
transpired, while it is, according to Your Majesty’s orders, our task to localize 
the Austro-Serbian conflict. The solution of this problem is so difficult that 
even a minor incident can tip the scales. 
Unfortunately Bethmann’s reprimand to the Crown Prince is not in the files, 
but according to Riezler it was a clear disassociation from the warlike elements 
of the German ruling classes.46 
On the day of the Austrian ultimatum Bethmann began to contemplate the 
aftermath of the crisis.  
The Chancellor tells me that [Russian Foreign Minister] Sazonov said to [the 
banker] Robby Mendelssohn the other day: ‘Si l’Allemagne lache l’Autriche, 
je lacherai immediatement après la France.’ He seems to toy with such possi-
bilities. A lasting understanding with Russia would be preferable to an agree-
ment with England. But its difficulties are far greater. Russia is far more ex-
acting. 
The alternative of sacrificing Vienna to a Russo-German accord was as quickly 
discarded as it had arisen. “We must maintain Austria proper. Were Russia to 
unleash the South Slavs, we would be lost.” Any agreement short of partition-
ing the Habsburg Empire would be at best an uneasy truce, and to begin nego-
tiations with Sazonov now would only give him new weapons in London and 
Paris. “If the Serbian quarrel passes without Russian mobilization, we can 
safely come to an understanding with the Tsar, [who will be] disappointed in 
the Western powers, once Austria is satisfied.”47 Despite such speculation, 
Bethmann reassured William II, “It is improbable that England will immedi-
ately enter the fray.”48 
Since local war now seemed likely, Bethmann had to ascertain the attitude 
of the Social Democrats. Unsure of their ideological course, bereft of the lea-
dership of Bebel, the Socialists vacillated between an internationalist and a 
social-patriot posture. The Chancellor seized upon the opportunity for drawing 
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them completely into the Prussian fold “by insuring himself of their views, by 
negotiating with them in person, and by requesting guarantees from the military 
against the stupidities of red-baiters in uniform.” One should “emphasize the 
defensive war.” In order to assure a united front at home, Russia had to be 
blamed for the coming conflict at all costs. But Bethmann was at the same time 
sincerely convinced: “Should war break out, it will result from Russian mobili-
zation ab irato, before possible negotiations. In that case we could hardly sit 
and talk any longer, because we have to strike immediately in order to have any 
chance of winning at all.”49 
The Austrian ultimatum to Serbia had escalated the conflict. Still in Hohen-
finow, the Chancellor was constantly on the telephone to Berlin, attempting to 
prepare for all eventualities, while trying to keep William II from cutting short 
his northern cruise. In a conference in the Prussian Ministry of War, Vice-
Chancellor Delbrück forced the adoption of a moratorium of the planned ar-
rests of the Reichsfeinde, making the later loyalty of many Socialists, Poles, 
Danes, and Alsatians possible.50 First warnings to the merchant marine were 
issued and measures of financial mobilization discussed. But the Wilhelm-
strasse feared “the Austrian note was clumsy, much too verbose.” Everyone 
was anxiously watching “the first telegrams on the reaction of the great powers 
to the Viennese démarche come in.” It was time for Bethmann to return to 
Berlin and take charge during the critical phase of the confrontation. Riezler 
speculated: “What does fate will? Alas, fate is blind, unconscious, and tangled 
in accidents. Whoever dares to seize it, holds it.”51 Immediately after arriving at 
the Reichskanzlerpalais, Bethmann cabled the Emperor that the Austrians 
considered the Serbian reply inadequate and had broken off diplomatic rela-
tions. But he still maintained that “in Paris and London one is working for the 
localization of the conflict.” Would his calculated risk succeed?52 
On July 26, William II decided to return with the German fleet, contrary to 
his Chancellor’s urgent advice. The Emperor feared another Port Arthur and 
curtly ordered Bethmann to report to him on the situation the following after-
noon in Potsdam. But the Chancellor replied: “As long as Russia does not 
commit a hostile act, I believe that our stand, directed towards localization, 
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must remain peaceful, too.”53 First rumors of Russian mobilization spurred 
Bethmann to warn Lichnowsky:  
Should they be confirmed, we would be forced to take countermeasures 
against our will. Even today we try to localize the conflict and keep peace in 
Europe. We therefore ask Sir Edward Grey [the British Foreign Minister] to 
use his influence in Petersburg in this direction.54  
Bavarian Ambassador Lerchenfeld believed that “the policy of the German 
Empire is directed towards having our ally [Austria] emerge with a gain in 
prestige but also towards maintaining world peace.”55 The goal of a Balkan 
victory but prevention of a general war inspired the Chancellor’s instruction to 
Ambassador Schoen in Paris: “We cannot mediate in the conflict between 
Austria and Serbia, but probably [we will do so] between Austria and Rus-
sia.”56 
The initial reaction of the great powers to the ultimatum was not too discou-
raging.  
It is of crucial importance that Sazonov, though angry, has avoided commit-
ting himself. Paris is aghast at England’s cold shoulder: an Austro-Serbian 
conflict does not concern me. Italy blackmails. [Vienna and Rome] have ap-
parently not yet agreed. Everything depends upon Petersburg, will it mobilize 
immediately and be encouraged or discouraged by the West? 
Now Bethmann grew pessimistic about the outcome: “The Chancellor sees a 
fate greater than human power hanging over Europe and our nation.” His dark 
forebodings were brushed away by the reaction of the people, milling around 
the Wilhelmstrasse:  
At first the Chancellor thought only young men would delight in the opportu-
nity for ruckus and excitement and parade their curiosity. But the crowds grew 
and grew, the songs rang truer, the Chancellor was finally deeply moved, 
touched and heartened, since similar news poured in from all corners of the 
Empire. 
Riezler saw “an immense, if undirected drive for action in the people, a longing 
for great movement, for supporting a noble cause, for showing one’s valor.” A 
shy and retiring man, Bethmann was deeply moved by this wave of sympathy, 
which seemed to vindicate his perilous course.57 
While the Chancellor supported mediation between Vienna and Petersburg, 
Grey suddenly jeopardized the essential precondition of his strategy: “Eng-
land’s language has changed – apparently London finally realized that the 
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Entente will be torn asunder if Whitehall is too lukewarm towards Russia. 
Lichnowsky has completely lost his composure.” Bethmann feared the grave 
“danger that France and England will commit their support to Russia in order 
not to alienate it, perhaps without really believing that for us mobilization 
means war, thinking of it as a bluff which they answer with a counterbluff.”58 
Grey’s declaration that he could no longer keep Britain aloof from the Austro-
Serbian quarrel rendered localization impossible, since no one was left to me-
diate between the alliances. “As long as it remained Austro-Serbian” the British 
Foreign Secretary “would hold back. But now Grey sees himself forced to 
intervene, since the conflict threatens to become Austro-Russian and thereby 
European.” Although never completely sure of British neutrality, Bethmann 
had based his decision for a diplomatic offensive on the assumption of Eng-
land’s cooperation in limiting the spread of a Balkan conflict, as in 1913.59 Now 
Grey’s change in position, endangering localization, created “immense commo-
tion in the Wilhelmstrasse. Nobody sleeps. I [Riezler] see the Chancellor only 
for seconds.” The sudden danger transformed him completely. “He has not a 
minute to ponder and is fresh, active, lively, and without anxiety.”60 
Although on the day of the Austrian declaration of war the situation im-
proved temporarily, Bethmann was becoming disgusted with his ally, since 
Vienna’s hesitation increased the likelihood of English interference.  
This Austrian ambiguity is unbearable. They refuse to inform us of their pro-
gram, saying expressis verbis that Count Hoyos’ suggestion to partition Serbia 
was purely private; in Petersburg they act like lambs, thinking no evil; and in 
London their embassy boasts about doling out Serbian territories to Bulgaria 
and Albania.”61 
The Chancellor was desperately trying to control the crisis according to his 
original plan. Bethmann instructed Pourtalès to emphasize Vienna’s denial of 
territorial interests in Serbia to Sazonov in order to keep Russia from mobiliz-
ing, while Lichnowsky should stress in London that the conflict was not be-
tween the alliances but merely between two Balkan powers.62 Simultaneously 
he was pressing the diplomatic offensive in Sofia and Constantinople to be in a 
better position, should a wider conflict arise.63 
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On reading Serbia’s conciliatory reply to the ultimatum, William II suddenly 
reversed his bellicose stand, deciding that Vienna should be content with a 
diplomatic triumph. This was a clear defection from the original strategy, 
which had considered a diplomatic victory insufficient, because of the internal 
malaise of the Habsburg monarchy.64 Bethmann accommodated himself to the 
imperial volte face by communicating the British offer of mediation to 
Tschirschky, without endorsing it so as not to embarrass Berchtold. In the early 
morning hours of the following day the Chancellor instructed his ambassador 
to transmit the “Halt in Belgrade” scheme to Francis Joseph as a peaceful alter-
native or as an alibi, should everything fail. “It is of utmost necessity that the 
responsibility for the expansion of the conflict to the other powers should, in all 
circumstances, fall upon Russia.” Despite the Austrian declaration of war, 
Bethmann hoped that British mediation would prevent the spread of the confla-
gration, as long as Vienna quickly seized Belgrade from Serbia and then nego-
tiated with St. Petersburg before the latter could mobilize.65 
The full effect of the Austrian declaration of war was felt only on the after-
noon of July 29. By collaborating closely with Sir Edward Grey, Bethmann 
hoped to prevent Russian mobilization. In repeated conversations with Goschen 
and in numerous instructions to Lichnowsky, he tried to localize the conflict, 
while criticizing Grey’s proposal for a conference of Ambassadors to mediate 
in the dispute, because it would mean a new Algeciras for Germany.66 His 
difficulties increased when later the same day the news of partial Russian mo-
bilization reached Berlin: “Now we had to work at top speed for five days in a 
row from five or six in the morning,” Riezler complained. Russian pressure 
forced Bethmann to decide “to what extent Germany should meet the English 
proposal of mediation.” Serious disagreements developed between the  
Wilhelmstrasse and Prince Lichnowsky, making it all the more difficult for the 
Chancellor to communicate with Grey. Moreover “it was clear from the very 
beginning that Italy would not go along. They twist and turn the alliance treaty 
and [Foreign Minister] San Giuliano claims not to have been informed in 
time.”67 
“Thank God, the Chancellor stepped in firmly,” Riezler sighed in relief over 
the treatment of the Social Democrats. “Of course, there are generals who want 
to meddle immediately and shoot in order to ‘teach the Reds a lesson.’” Over 
military protests, Bethmann succeeded in preventing the arrest of any Socialist 
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leaders. “The Chancellor negotiated secretly with Südekum,” a revisionist 
Reichstag deputy. In an unprecedented move, Bethmann drew a leading Social-
ist into his confidence with a candid assessment of the international situation.68 
Later the same day Südekum answered for his party: “Your Excellency’s step 
of directly informing [us] in this critical moment has met with full sympathy.” 
Since Bethmann guaranteed that there would be no arrests, Südekum promised 
“that no action whatsoever (general or partial strike, sabotage, etc.) was 
planned or need be feared – especially because of our desire to serve peace.” 
Because of this agreement the Chancellor exhorted the Emperor: “In all events 
Russia must ruthlessly be put into the wrong.”69 
When the military leaders clamored for immediate mobilization, Bethmann 
countered that only if Russia mobilized first would England allow Germany to 
mobilize without intervening. For the time being Moltke and Falkenhayn ac-
quiesced, but late that night they forced the Chancellor to send warnings to 
Petersburg and Paris to desist from further military preparations.70 Since British 
intervention was becoming more and more likely, Bethmann now seriously 
pressured Vienna to accept Grey’s proffered hand by stopping in Belgrade. 
“We are certainly ready to fulfill our obligations as ally,” he implored 
Berchtold, “but we clearly must refuse to be drawn lightly into a world confla-
gration by Vienna without consideration of our proposals.”71 Riezler was even 
more disgusted with “the Austrians (bureaucrats gone mad, stubborn and 
dumb)” because of their reluctance in making territorial concessions to Rome 
in order to insure Italian neutrality. “All agree that if the Ballplatz had not 
procrastinated so long in its dealings with Rome and with the whole Serbian 
operation, everything would have ended in a diplomatic victory.” Revealing the 
Chancellor’s calculation, Riezler jotted down: “The Austrian action had to 
follow immediately ... in the wake of the murder, not as a premeditated act, not 
as a long-prepared humiliation.”72 
Grey’s change of heart forced Bethmann to make a desperate move. Unable 
to achieve a clear picture of British intentions from the conflicting reports of 
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Lichnowsky and the Hamburg shipping magnate Albert Ballin,73 the Chancellor 
decided to test Goschen with a formula reminiscent of the Haldane negotiations 
of 1912. “We can assure the English cabinet – presupposing its neutrality –” 
Bethmann beckoned, “that even in case of a victorious war, we will seek no 
territorial aggrandizement in Europe at the cost of France.” To assuage White-
hall’s fear of a fundamental shift in the continental balance of power, the Chan-
cellor declared that he would respect Dutch territorial integrity though leaving 
open the fate of the French colonies. “Presupposing that Belgium does not take 
sides against us,” Bethmann was willing to guarantee its boundaries, but added: 
“We do not know which countermeasures French actions in a possible war 
might force us to take.” His studied silence regarding Belgian sovereignty 
implicitly revealed the threat to its neutrality contained in Moltke’s strategy of 
outflanking the French, following the Schlieffen Plan. But the Chancellor’s 
purpose was diplomatic rather than military: “England’s assurance of a neutral 
position in the present conflict,” his most cherished goal, “‘would enable him 
[to enter into] a general neutrality agreement in the future,’” the reward of 
which – stricken on William’s insistence – would be a naval agreement.74 On 
reading this “infamous” offer, the Germanophobe Crowe, Assistant to the For-
eign Secretary, noted sarcastically: “The only comment that need be made on 
these astounding proposals is that they reflect discredit on the statesman who 
makes them.” Though consistent with his earlier policy, Bethmann’s blunder-
ing initiative was a desperate last-minute attempt to stave off British interven-
tion with the crude promise of the territorial status quo ante in Western Europe, 
if London immobilized Paris, Brussels, and The Hague. British love for Berlin 
did not increase at gun-point and Jagow sourly conceded to Goschen the next 
morning that had Lichnowsky’s warning of Grey’s intention to keep his hands 
free arrived some hours earlier, Bethmann would not have taken this drastic 
step.75 
The 30th of July offered a respite to the harried Chancellor. Before the hasti-
ly assembled Prussian Ministry of State, Bethmann defended his strategy: 
“Germany and England have undertaken all steps to avoid a European war.” 
Admitting that “we have lost control and the landslide has begun,” he neverthe-
less insisted: “As a political leader I am not abandoning my hope and my at-
tempts to keep the peace as long as my démarche in Vienna has not been re-
jected.”76 More than ever before he pressed the Ballplatz to accept English 
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mediation, but despite urgent long-distance calls, Berchtold refused any com-
promise. After a long internal struggle Russia now decided to mobilize. Frantic 
appeals to London and to Vienna to re-establish pourparlers with Sazonov 
were of little avail. The network of events had become too tangled to be unra-
veled without a major war. When the military demanded a deadline for the 
decision about mobilization, the reluctant Chancellor could do nothing but set it 
at noon on July 31.77 Explaining his predicament to Lerchenfeld, he claimed 
that he had done his utmost: “This evening I have most energetically declared 
to the Viennese cabinet that Germany will not swim in Austria’s wake in the 
Balkans. Should Vienna reply affirmatively I still do not despair for peace.” 
But Bethmann was too realistic to deny the danger: “Sad to say, through quasi-
elemental forces and the persistent poisoning of relations among the cabinets, a 
war desired by no one might be unleashed.”78 
When the news of the Russian general mobilization was confirmed at nine 
o’clock the next morning, the die was cast. “Strange that the unscrupulousness 
of the Russian grand dukes decided the issue in the enemy camp,” Riezler 
mused four weeks later. “Perhaps they lied to the Tsar that Germany had al-
ready mobilized. At any rate they wildly exaggerated Russian strength, since 
they earn millions from war supplies.” In deep sorrow he contrasted the “Chan-
cellor’s scruples” about his responsibility with the “icy hypocrisy” of Grey.79 
Now Bethmann could no longer hold out against Moltke’s demand for mobili-
zation. An unauthorized telegram from the German Chief of Staff to General 
Conrad, his Austrian counterpart, snuffed out the last hope for moderation. 
Military necessity took over, the state of impending war was proclaimed, and 
ultimatums were sent to St. Petersburg and Paris.80 
The rest was anti-climactic. Bethmann and the Foreign Office went through 
the motions of last-minute compromise but they were directed more towards a 
closing of the ranks at home than towards peace abroad. A curious reversal had 
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taken place. What had begun as a limited diplomatic offensive had passed 
beyond the bounds of politics into the realm of the military. Not personal 
weakness but the hallowed Kommandogewalt reduced the Chancellor to the 
position of being only one of several advisers to the Emperor. This Bismarck-
ian legacy dimmed Bethmann’s voice of restraint. The declarations of war 
against Russia and France, and especially the violation of Belgian neutrality, 
were decided over his strongest protests. The logic of his diplomatic gamble 
had carried Bethmann to the point where he could only pray: “When the iron 
dice begin to roll, may God help us!”81 
In this mood he took leave from the deeply agitated Goschen, who ex-
claimed repeatedly: “Oh, it is too terrible!” Bethmann reminded the British 
ambassador that it had been his foremost goal to establish closer relations with 
England: “All these attempts on which, as he well knew, I had worked inces-
santly, were wrested from me. And by whom? By England; and why? Because 
of Belgian neutrality!” The Chancellor refused to believe that his work of five 
peaceful years had been in vain:  
Can this neutrality which we violate only out of necessity, fighting for our 
very existence, and with the express assurance that we will repay any damage, 
if Belgium lets us march through – can this neutrality and the way in which it 
is threatened, really provide the reason for a world war? 
he queried. “Compared to the disaster of such a holocaust does not the signifi-
cance of this neutrality dwindle into a scrap of paper?”82 
His entreaties, colored by remorse, came too late. Bethmann had not ac-
cepted mediation soon enough. He had underestimated the British commitment 
to the Entente, based on the strategic importance of the channel coast, and had 
failed to consider that his own hand might be forced by the generals. Neverthe-
less, the Chancellor passionately repeated: “It is a crime that Russia has forced 
war upon us while we are still mediating between Vienna and Petersburg, and a 
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Franco-Russian war against Germany is enough of a disaster.” The calculated 
risk was leading to the third, most harmful alternative.  
This war turns into an unlimited world catastrophe only through England’s 
participation. It was in London’s hands to curb French revanchism and pan-
Slav chauvinism. Whitehall has not done so, but rather repeatedly egged them 
on. Now England actively helps them. 
He protested movingly: “Germany, the Emperor, and the government are 
peace-loving. That the ambassador knows as well as I do. We enter the war 
with a clear conscience, but England’s responsibility is monumental.” Sir  
Edward broke into tears. After a few moments, the British ambassador regained 
his composure and left the chancellery.83 
Only in one respect did Bethmann’s fears prove unfounded. The nation re-
sponded with great enthusiasm to what it considered a defensive war against 
Russia. “The incomparable storm unleashed in the people has swept before it 
all the doubting, half-hearted, and timid minds. The foreigners whom [Riezler] 
observed had tears in their eyes. The skeptical statesman was surprised by the 
nation.” After the grave disappointment in England, this unexpected response 
from the people was heartening. Riezler well sensed “the uncontrived but pro-
found effect of Bethmann’s seriousness; the deep moral anguish from which 
every decision flows. Precisely that has called forth the best qualities of our 
inexhaustible nation.”84 The upsurge of the masses, milling about Unter den 
Linden and singing Heil Dir im Siegerkranz, made Bethmann wax eloquent: 
“Should all our attempts [for peace] be in vain, should the sword be forced into 
our hand, we will go into battle with a clear conscience and the knowledge that 
we did not desire this war.” But more candidly he sighed to Wahnschaffe, one 
of his closest friends, after signing the mobilization order: “It is a misfortune 
that I could not prevent the war. Now we must muster all our strength to win 
it.”85  
The crucial decision of July 5 represents not the policy of one man, one 
class, or one branch of government; it was rather a tenuous compromise be-
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tween the conflicting views of the decision-makers, Bethmann, William II, 
Zimmermann, Falkenhayn and the military entourage. According to the Saxon 
ambassador “the Foreign Office believes that war between Austria-Hungary 
and Serbia will be avoided.”86 But the Emperor, deeply shocked by the assassi-
nation of Francis Ferdinand, reacted impulsively, demanding: “The Serbs have 
to be straightened out, and soon!” William II prejudiced the issue by assuring 
Szögyény and Hoyos his support before consulting the Chancellor, although 
reserving his final decision until Bethmann could approve.87 The military, 
represented by Prussian Minister of War Falkenhayn, chief of the military 
cabinet Lyncker, and Adjutant General Plessen, followed the imperial lead in 
pressing for strong punitive action. Aroused by Hoyos, Undersecretary of State 
Zimmermann and some of the younger officials of the Wilhelmstrasse also 
flirted with the use of force.88 
Under this pressure, the Chancellor embarked upon a political offensive in 
the Balkans in order to break the noose of encirclement. In November 1913 
Bethmann had warned that pan-German dreams might turn into nightmares: “In 
any future war, undertaken without compelling cause, not only the Hohenzol-
lern crown, but the future of Germany will be at stake. Certainly our policy 
must be led boldly,” he admitted, “but to rattle the sword at every diplomatic 
entanglement without Germany’s honor, safety, or future being threatened is 
not only blind, but criminal.”89 His sudden resolve for action in July 1914 need 
not be attributed to fatalism or personal weakness. It rather resulted from the 
Chancellor’s basic conviction that the pan-Slav agitation threatened the exis-
tence of Austria and thereby – according to Bismarck – Germany’s vital inter-
ests. The Sarajevo assassination gave him the chance to reverse the deteriora-
tion of the Central Powers’ diplomatic and military strength in one bold and 
dramatic stroke. Because of Europe’s revulsion against the crime a swift puni-
tive strike against Serbia could succeed without great power intervention. 
However, this initial compromise hardly decided anything at all. Vienna was 
                                                             
86  Lichtenau to Vitzthum, July 2; Geiss, Julikrise, 1, No. 12. “Deutschlands Lage und seine 
politischen Richtlinien 1913/1914”; AA Bonn, Nachlass Jagow, MS Politische Aufsätze, 
pp. 69-82. The Foreign Secretary maintains: “Imperialist goals such as world domination 
were far from our minds.” 
87  Imperial marginalia on Tschirschky to Bethmann, June 30; AA Bonn, Wk vol. I, and 
Szögyény to Berchtold, July 5; Geiss, Julikrise, 1, No. 21. 
88  H. Hantsch, Berchtold, II, 569ff. 
89  Bethmann to Crown Prince, Nov. 15, 1913, refuting General Gebsattel’s pan-German 
proposal of a coup d’état and a foreign policy bordering on preventive war. In the Morocco 
crisis neither “Germany’s honor nor dignity was threatened by another nation. Whoever 
desires war without such cause, must do it for vital interests [Lebensaufgaben der Nation] 
so basic that they cannot be achieved without war,” as in 1864, 1866 and 1870. Deutsches 
Zentralarchiv, Potsdam (cited DZA Potsdam), Reichskanzlei No. 825. Cf. H. Pogge-von 
Strandmann, “Staatsstreichpläne, Alldeutsche und Bethmann Hollweg,” Hamburger Studi-
en zur neueren Geschichte, II (1965), 7-45. 
 77
still free to choose between diplomatic or military action, the generals could 
hope for the larger war, prepared so long, and the diplomats would strive un-
flaggingly to prevent the spread of the conflagration. Acceptance of the risk of 
local war and the possibility of continental war – should it prove unavoidable – 
was the crucial shift in the Chancellor’s policy which Szögyény reported to the 
Ballplatz: “Hitherto Bethmann has always advised us to get along with Serbia, 
but after the recent events, he realizes that it is well-nigh impossible.”90 
If for three weeks Berlin spoke with a single voice, the precarious unity was 
shattered by two events: England’s intervention and Russian mobilization. 
Torpedoing the strategy of localization, these unforeseen actions revealed a 
breach in the German leadership that made Berchtold utter in astonishment: 
“Who governs [in Berlin], Moltke or Bethmann?”91 Though he endorsed local 
war, the Chancellor watched the drift into continental war with growing appre-
hension and as soon as he realized the serious danger of world war, he despe-
rately pushed for negotiations in Vienna while the generals grew more and 
more impatient to fight. “The Chancellor told me last night,” Goschen cabled 
on the 30th, “that he was ‘pressing the button’ as hard as he could and that he 
was not sure whether [the] length to which he had gone in giving moderate 
advice in Vienna had not precipitated matters rather than otherwise.”92 Fear of a 
general war was the motive behind the Chancellor’s eagerness in seizing upon 
Lichnowsky’s erroneous report that Britain might remain neutral after all. But 
the ambiguity of the original compromise had carried Bethmann to the brink of 
a world conflagration and transferred the final decision to the military. Only in 
this manner can the confusion of the Wilhelmstrasse, the consternation of the 
Chancellor and the complete lack of diplomatic preparation for war with 
France, Russia, and England be understood.93 
The strategy of localization was an act of desperation for Bethmann, a ne-
cessary risk to preserve the empire. Psychologically the German stand was, 
indeed, defensive. But the means that were adopted, the diplomatic offensive in 
the Balkans, the encouragement of Austrian punitive action against Serbia, the 
effort to prevent the intervention of the great powers and the attempt to split the 
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Entente were offensive. Among the probable outcomes of the crisis Bethmann 
clearly preferred local war, was willing to gamble on continental war, but he 
abhorred world war. Believing that he had no alternative, the Chancellor de-
cided on a “leap into the dark.” As so often the concept of limited war proved 
elusive and drew Germany deeper and deeper into the vortex. Technically 
Austrian procrastination largely produced Grey’s intervention and Russian 
mobilization. But after a generation of rampant imperialism, the risk of war 
could no longer be calculated in terms of cabinet diplomacy. Yet when remi-
niscing under the burden of defeat, Bethmann saw no other way. “We were 
severely handicapped by the war of [18]70-71 and by our geographical posi-
tion. Since the coronation of Emperor [William II] we often did the opposite of 
that which would have lightened our burden,” he admitted frankly. But  
surely imperialism would have triumphed even without our help, and it re-
mains highly questionable if, even with the most reasonable policy, we could 
have prevented the natural French, Russian, and English opposition from unit-
ing against us. We have become guilty, 
he confessed, “but only universal and collective guilt has brought about the 
world catastrophe.”94 
“I am no war chancellor!” Bethmann protested in deep anguish to Jagow 
when the bloodshed had become inescapable.95 “By God, we did not want this 
war,” he repeated again and again to his moderate supporters at home and 
abroad.96 Though exaggerated, his recurrent claims contain a kernel of truth, 
because the Chancellor was drawn into the maelstrom of imperialism not as a 
rabid pan-German expansionist but as a traditional nationalist. Despite the 
failure of his calculated risk, to Riezler “the Chancellor is the only one who has 
gained new stature during the crisis. I have learned to revere him because of his 
conduct, so self-effacing, self-denying, and unostentatious. How silently he 
bears the burden of having to lead the German people into war.”97 In spite of 
his insistent disclaimers, the shadow of this responsibility pursued Bethmann to 
his deathbed. During the height of the fighting he sighed to the liberal journalist 
Theodor Wolff: “When assessing the responsibility for this war – we have to 
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confess honestly that we bear a share of the guilt. If I said this thought op-
presses me, I would say too little – this thought never leaves me. I live in it.”98 
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